DEFENDERS OF DIGNITY

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Constitution. Plaintiffs argue that they are likely to succeed on all of their claims, that they will

suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, and that the balance of equities and public

interest tip in their favor. Defendants respond that President Trump determined that the situation

in Portland met the statutory criteria under Section 12406, and under the deference this Court

must give that determination, Plaintiffs’ fail to show a likelihood of success on that claim. And

absent a showing that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 12406, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs cannot show that they are likely to succeed on their remaining claims.

​

For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on

their claim that the President’s federalization of the Oregon National Guard exceeded his

statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 and was ultra vires. In addition, because Section

12406 defines the scope of Congress’s constitutional delegation to the President to federalize the

National Guard, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the President exceeded his

constitutional authority and violated the Tenth Amendment. Because this Court finds that

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on these two claims, this Court declines to reach Plaintiffs’

arguments regarding their likelihood of success on their remaining claims. Plaintiffs also have

adequately shown irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in

their favor. This Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order.

​

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

​

1. Section 12406 Claim

a. Statutory Framework

Under the Militia Clause of U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power “[t]o provide for

calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel

Invasions.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Congress first delegated authority to the President to

call forth the militia in extraordinary, limited circumstances in the Militia Act of 1792. See Ch.

 

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28, § 1, 1 Stat. 264–65. Congress affirmed this power in the Militia Act of 1795, which “was a

precursor to the Militia Act of 1903.” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1047. The Militia Act of 1903

created the modern framework of the National Guard, see Ch. 196, § 25, 32 Stat. 775 (1903), and

this statute was the “precursor to [10 U.S.C.] § 12406.” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1047.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, the President may federalize National Guard service members

if:

(1) the United States, or any of the Commonwealths or

possessions, is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign

nation;

(2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority

of the Government of the United States; or

(3) the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the

laws of the United States.

​

After making this determination, the President may federalize National Guard troops “in such

numbers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress the rebellion, or execute those

laws. Orders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States or, in the case

of the District of Columbia, through the commanding general of the National Guard of the

District of Columbia.” Id.

​

In Newsom II, the Ninth Circuit held that 10 U.S.C. § 12406 does not “preclude[] judicial

review of the President’s determination that a statutory precondition exists.” 141 F.4th at 1047.2

However, a reviewing court must give “a great level of deference to the President’s

determination that a predicate condition exists.” Id. at 1048. A court “review[s] the President’s

determination to ensure that it reflects a colorable assessment of the facts and law within a ‘range

2 Defendants argue that the President’s determination under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 is

unreviewable, but they acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has held that this determination is

reviewable. Resp., ECF 35 at 18–19.

​

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of honest judgment.’” Id. at 1051 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 278 U.S. 378, 399 (1932)). At

the same time, the Executive’s “exercise of his authority to maintain peace” must be “conceived

in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or

the prevention of its continuance.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Sterling, 278 U.S. at 399–

400).

​

b. Whether the President is Unable with the Regular Forces to Execute the

​

Laws of the United States

​

Defendants first argue that the President “had a colorable basis for invoking § 12406(3),”

id. at 1052, because he was “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United

States.” 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3); see Resp., ECF 35 at 20–22. Although Section 12406(3) “does

not have as a prerequisite that the President be completely precluded from executing the relevant

laws of the United States,” “minimal interference with the execution of laws is, by itself,”

insufficient “to justify invoking § 12406(3).” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051.

​

As a threshold matter, this Court must determine to what extent the President can rely on

violence that occurred months prior to his September 27, 2025 federalization directive and that

had subsided by September. Under Newsom II, and as a matter of logic, this Court assesses

whether the President invoked Section 12406(3) based on “a colorable assessment of the facts”

as they existed at the time he federalized the National Guard. Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051. In

Newsom II, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the “protesters’ interference with the ability of federal

officers to execute the laws, leading up to the President’s federalization of the National Guard on

June 7.” Id. at 1052 (emphasis added). And the Ninth Circuit specifically cited events from “the

day before” the June 7, 2025 federalization order to conclude that “the President had a colorable

basis for invoking § 12406(3).” Id. Likewise, this Court will focus on “the ability of federal

​

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officers to execute the laws[] leading up to the President’s federalization of the National Guard”

on September 28, 2025. Id.

​

In this case, and unlike in Newsom II, Plaintiffs provide substantial evidence that the

protests at the Portland ICE facility were not significantly violent or disruptive in the days—or

even weeks—leading up to the President’s directive on September 27, 2025. The record evidence

establishes that while disruption outside the Portland ICE facility peaked in June of 2025, federal

and local law enforcement officers were able to “quell[] . . . the disorder.” Newsom II, 141 F.4th

at 1051 (quoting Sterling, 278 U.S. at 399–400). As of September 27, 2025, it had been months

since there was any sustained level of violent or disruptive protest activity in Portland. During

this time frame, there were sporadic events requiring either PPB monitoring or federal law

enforcement intervention, but overall, the protests were small and uneventful.

​

Defendants’ declarants describe only four incidents of protesters clashing with federal

officers in the month of September preceding the federalization order—on September 1st, 9th,

12th, and without further specification, the second week of September. Wamsley Decl., ECF 38

¶¶ 16, 18; Cantu Decl., ECF 40 ¶ 15. The first involved protesters setting up a makeshift

guillotine to intimidate federal officials; the second involved four people shining overpowered

flashlights in the eyes of drivers; the third involved someone posting a photograph of an

unmarked ICE vehicle online; and the last involved additional drivers having flashlights shone in

their eyes. Cantu Decl., ECF 40 ¶ 15; Wamsley Decl., ECF 38 ¶¶ 16–18. These incidents are

inexcusable, but they are nowhere near the type of incidents that cannot be handled by regular

law enforcement forces. They also occurred at least two weeks before President Trump issued

his directive. More broadly, these incidents are categorically different from the violent incidents

as described in Newsom II that took place in Los Angeles when the President federalized the

​

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California National Guard on June 7, 2025. See 141 F.4th at 1052 (“[P]rotesters threw objects at

ICE vehicles trying to complete a law enforcement operation, ‘pinned down’ several FPS

officers defending federal property by throwing ‘concrete chunks, bottles of liquid, and other

objects,’ and used ‘large rolling commercial dumpsters as a battering ram’ in an attempt to

breach the parking garage of a federal building.”).

​

Plaintiffs provide all the PPB call logs in the month of September, which show that PPB

worked in close coordination with FPS supervisors and regularly checked the status of the ICE

facility. As detailed above, they also show that the protest activity in September generally did not

involve violence against federal property or personnel. At the hearing, Defendants highlighted a

September 19 entry relating to FPS reporting an assault by a known agitator against other

protestors and a journalist. Hughes Decl., Ex. 19, ECF 46-19. This isolated assault, which did not

target federal personnel, and which occurred a week before the federalization order, along with

the other isolated September incidents, do not approach the level of disruption to federal

functions in Los Angeles that Newsom II described as occurring “the day before” President

Trump’s June 7, 2025 federalization of the California National Guard. 141 F.4th at 1052. Neither

outside the Portland ICE facility nor elsewhere in the City of Portland was there unlawful

activity akin to what was occurring in Los Angeles leading up to June 7, 2025. See id. at 1041

(describing the riotous activity).

​

Defendants also argue that strained FPS resources suffice to show that the President had a

colorable basis to invoke Section 12406(3). Resp., ECF 35 at 20–21. But they demonstrate just

the opposite, that federal law enforcement officers, unaided by any military forces, were capable

of not only “quelling” the violence in June but also “preventi[ng]” it through September.

Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051 (quoting Sterling, 287 at 399–400). The Deputy Director of the

​

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Federal Protective Service Region that encompasses Oregon noted that to date, FPS has deployed

115 officers from other FPS Regions to Portland. Cantu Decl., ECF 40 ¶ 18. This deployment of

additional federal law enforcement officers reduced the level of disorder between June and

September to the point that in the immediate days leading up to the federalization order, around

twenty or fewer protesters gathered outside the ICE Facility and “FPS indicated no issues or

criminal reports.” Hughes Decl., Ex. 22, ECF 46-22 to Ex. 26, ECF 46-26. On September 26, the

eve of the President’s directive, law enforcement “observed approximately 8–15 people at any

given time out front of ICE. Mostly sitting in lawn chairs and walking around. Energy was low,

minimal activity.” Hughes Decl., Ex. 26, ECF 46-26. It is clear that “the regular forces,” i.e. FPS

and additional federal law enforcement, were able to execute the laws of the United States.

​

Defendants’ argument that this diversion of federal law enforcement officers from out-ofstate

demonstrates that “the regular forces” were unable to execute the laws is not persuasive.

Defendants’ proposed test for Section 12406(3) would allow the President to call in the National

Guard whenever one law enforcement office receives support from another office, which is a

routine aspect of law enforcement activity. If the President could equate diversion of federal

resources with his inability to execute federal law, then the President could send military troops

virtually anywhere at any time.

​

In support of their opposition, Defendants also rely on occurrences of violence elsewhere

in the country and the risk that peaceful protests in Portland might escalate into violence “at any

moment.” Resp., ECF 35 at 13. But violence in a different state and the mere potential for future

escalation do not provide a colorable basis to invoke Section 12406(3). To accept Defendants’

arguments would be to render meaningless the extraordinary requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 12406

by allowing the President to federalize one state’s National Guard based on events in a different

​

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state or mere speculation about future events. In other words, violence elsewhere cannot support

troop deployments here, and concern about hypothetical future conduct does not demonstrate a

present inability to execute the laws using nonmilitary federal law enforcement.

​

Finally, the President’s own statements regarding the deployment of federalized National

Guardsmen further support that his determination was not “conceived in good faith” or “in the

face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its

continuance.” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sterling, 287 U.S. at

399–400). Despite the “minimal activity” outside the Portland ICE facility in the days preceding

September 27, 2025, Hughes Decl., Ex. 22, ECF 46-22 to Ex. 26, ECF 46-26, President Trump

directed Secretary Hegseth “to provide all necessary Troops to protect War ravaged Portland,

and any of our ICE Facilities under siege from attack by Antifa, and other domestic terrorists.”

Marshall Decl., Ex. 12, ECF 9-12. Two days before that directive, the President claimed that

Portland has “professional agitators” who are “paid a lot of money by rich people,” “anarchists,”

and “crazy people” who try to “burn down buildings, including federal buildings.” See Marshall

Decl., ECF 9 ¶ 26. Whatever the factual basis the President may have for these allegations,

nothing in the record suggests that anything of this sort was occurring “every night” outside the

Portland ICE building or in the City of Portland in the days or weeks leading up to his September

27 directive. Id.

​

In sum, the President is certainly entitled “a great level of deference,” Newsom II, 141

F.4th at 1048, in his determination that he “is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws

of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3). But “a great level of deference” is not equivalent to

ignoring the facts on the ground. As the Ninth Circuit articulated, courts must “review the

President’s determination to ensure that it reflects a colorable assessment of the facts and law

​

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within a ‘range of honest judgment.’” Id. at 1051 (quoting Sterling, 278 U.S. at 399). Here, this

Court concludes that the President did not have a “colorable basis” to invoke § 12406(3) to

federalize the National Guard because the situation on the ground belied an inability of federal

law enforcement officers to execute federal law. Id. at 1051–52. The President’s determination

was simply untethered to the facts.

​

c. Whether there is a Rebellion or Danger of Rebellion

Defendants also argue that the September 28, 2025 federalization order is authorized

under subsection two, which permits federalization of the National Guard in response to “a

rebellion or danger of a rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States.”

10 U.S.C. § 12406(2). In the June 7, 2025 Presidential Memo, President Trump stated that, “[t]o

the extent that protests or acts of violence directly inhibit the execution of the laws, they

constitute a form of rebellion.” Rieger Decl., Ex. D, ECF 37 at 20.

​

The parties disagree about the meaning of the word rebellion in the statute.

“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering

the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents and authorities that inform

the analysis.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). Additionally, courts must

interpret words in statutes “consistent with their ‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress

enacted the statute.’” Wisc. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 277 (2018) (quoting

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).

​

The Ninth Circuit did not reach the government’s rebellion arguments in Newsom II.

See 141 F.4th at 1051. In Newsom I, however, the district court performed a detailed statutory

interpretation of § 12406(2) that this Court finds instructive. 786 F. Supp. 3d at 1251. There, the

court surveyed four dictionaries from the late 1800s and early 1900s—when Congress passed the

first predecessor statute to § 12406, the Militia Act of 1903. See id. at 1252. From that survey,

​

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the court identified several shared characteristics of a rebellion, as Congress would have

understood the term in 1903:

​

First, a rebellion must not only be violent but also be armed.

Second, a rebellion must be organized. Third, a rebellion must be

open and avowed. Fourth, a rebellion must be against the

government as a whole—often with an aim of overthrowing the

government—rather than in opposition to a single law or issue.”

Id. at 1253 (emphasis omitted).

The court also considered three of the same definitions that the parties here proffer from

the current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary:

1. Open, organized, and armed resistance to an established

government or ruler; esp., an organized attempt to change the

government or leader of a country, [usually] through violence.

2. Open resistance or opposition to an authority or tradition.

3. Hist. Disobedience of a legal command or summons.

Id. at 1252 (quoting Rebellion, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)).

​

Plaintiffs advocate for the first definition, whereas Defendants advocate for the second

and third definitions. See Resp., ECF 35 at 22–23. As a threshold matter, the second and third

definitions that Defendants proffer fail to meet any of the shared characteristics of early 1900s

definitions of “rebellion”—that the rebellion be (1) violent and armed; (2) organized; (3) open

and avowed; and “against the government as a whole—often with an aim of overthrowing the

government.” See Newsom I, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 1253.

​

Even overlooking that problem, however, Defendants’ definition of rebellion also

contravenes the greater statutory context of § 12406. See Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486. In Newsom II,

the Ninth Circuit defined the statutory phrase “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws

of the United States” in subsection (3) by reference to “[t]he statutory context.” See 141 F.4th

at 1051. To do so, it compared the phrase to subsections (1) and (2). Id. “Subsections one and

​

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two of the statute describe unusual and extreme exigencies—invasions and rebellions—that

threaten the normal operations of civil government.” Id. Defendants’ broad proffered definitions

of rebellion fall far short of an unusual and extreme exigency.

​

Therefore, this Court reaches the same conclusion as the district court in Newsom I that

the following “key characteristics” provide the boundaries for what constitutes a “rebellion”:

First, a rebellion must not only be violent but also be armed.

​

Second, a rebellion must be organized. Third, a rebellion must be

open and avowed. Fourth, a rebellion must be against the

government as a whole—often with an aim of overthrowing the

government—rather than in opposition to a single law or issue.

Newsom I, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (emphasis omitted). Here, the protests in Portland were not

“a rebellion” and did not pose a “danger of a rebellion,” especially in the days leading up to the

federalization. As discussed above, Defendants presented evidence of sporadic violence against

federal officers and property damage to a federal building. Defendants have not, however,

proffered any evidence demonstrating that those episodes of violence were part of an organized

attempt to overthrow the government as a whole, and therefore, Defendants have failed to show

that the President had a colorable basis to conclude that Section 12406(2) was satisfied.

Defendants nevertheless argue that the President was authorized under Section 12406(2)

to quell “violent resistance to lawful enforcement of federal immigration law occurring in

Portland.” Resp., ECF 35 at 22. Indeed, the President also stated that “protests or acts of violence

[that] directly inhibit execution of the laws[] constitute a form of rebellion.” Rieger Decl., Ex. D,

ECF 37 at 20. These conceptions of rebellion improperly conflate the statutory preconditions in

Sections 12406(2) and (3). As discussed above, subsection (3) only authorizes the President to

federalize the National Guard if he is “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the

United States.” If subsection (2) (“rebellion”) was satisfied whenever “protests or acts of

violence directly inhibit execution of the laws,” subsection (3) (requiring inability to enforce

​

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federal law) would be superfluous. “If we were to adopt the federal government’s reading of

subsection [two], it would swallow subsection[ ] [three].” See Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051; see

also Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 490 (2024) (“Congress would not go to the trouble

of spelling out [a list of terms] if a neighboring term swallowed it up . . . .”).

​

1. Tenth Amendment

Defendants’ ultra vires federalization of Oregon’s National Guard troops also violates the

Tenth Amendment. “No matter the context, the President’s authority to act necessarily ‘stem[s]

either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’” Trump v. United States, 603 U.S.

593, 607 (2024) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).

The Tenth Amendment reserves to the States all rights and powers “not delegated to the United

States by the Constitution.” U.S. Const. amend. X. In turn, action that “exceeds the National

Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of the States.” Bond v.

United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011).

​

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “provide for calling forth the Militia to

execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 15. “Congress has delegated portions of that power to the President” in 10 U.S.C.

§ 12406. Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1055; see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636–38 (Jackson, J.,

concurring). Here, because the President is acting outside that delegation, he is “‘tak[ing]

measures incompatible with the expressed . . . will of Congress’ reflected in that statute.”

Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1045–46 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,

concurring)). “But the Constitution authorizes Congress, not the President, to determine when

(and how) the militia can be called into actual service of the United States.” Newsom II, 141

F.4th at 1045. Therefore, the President lacks constitutional authority to federalize the National

​

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Guard once he exceeds the constitutional authority that Congress granted him, such as in Section

12406.3

​

Because the President is federalizing the Oregon National Guard absent constitutional

authority, his actions undermine the sovereign interest of Oregon as protected by the Tenth

Amendment. Oregon has a Tenth Amendment power to control its National Guard to the extent it

is not cabined by the Militia Clause. And as discussed above, Defendants have acted outside the

scope of this constitutional authority conferred by Congress. Put another way, Defendants

“interfere[d] with the constitutional balance of power between the federal and state

governments” by federalizing state National Guardsmen for federal service when no statutory or

constitutional authority permitted their federalization. Brief for the State of California and

Governor Newsom as Amici Curiae, ECF 41-1 at 9.

​

B. Irreparable Harm

Having demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs must also show that

“irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in

original). Irreparable harm is that “for which there is no adequate legal remedy.” See Ariz.

Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). If a plaintiff is likely to

succeed on a constitutional claim, “that showing will almost always demonstrate [the plaintiff] is

suffering irreparable harm as well.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023).

3 In arguing that Defendants did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act, Defendants assert

that under the Take Care Clause, “the President has inherent Article II authority to use troops for

the protection of federal property and federal function.” Resp., ECF 35 at 25. But the President’s

inherent authority under the Take Care Clause does not support the conclusion that he has

inherent authority to federalize the state National Guard to accomplish this purpose. See Newsom

II, 141 F.4th at 1045 (“[T]he Constitution authorizes Congress, not the President, to determine

when (and how) the militia can be called into actual service of the United States.”).

​

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First, Oregon has demonstrated a likelihood that it will suffer a constitutional injury due

to Defendants’ violation of the state’s Tenth Amendment right to control its National Guard.

This encroachment on Oregon’s police power leaves an indelible mark on Oregon’s “sovereignty

under the Constitution,” see Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013), which cannot be

remedied by a “legal remedy, such as an award of damages.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal., 757 F.3d at

1068. Because Oregon is likely to succeed on its Tenth Amendment claim, it will also likely

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order.

​

Second, Plaintiffs claim “ongoing and concrete” harms to their “law enforcement and

public safety interests” due to the diversion of state resources. Motion, ECF 6 at 38 (quoting

Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012)). Federalizing Oregon National Guard members

diverts them from their state responsibilities, which impairs the State’s ability to call on the

Guard to respond to emergencies. See id. Further, state and local law enforcement will need to

expend additional resources to quell increased civil unrest that is likely to result from the

Guard’s mobilization. Dobson Decl., ECF 7 ¶ 30 (“Scaling resources to address protests based

on the federal deployment may mean that PPB is less able to respond to regular public safety

calls for service.”).

​

Defendants respond that the deployment, federalizing only 200 of a total 6,500 Oregon

National Guard members, does not substantially impair Oregon’s use of the overall force. Resp.,

ECF 35 at 35–37. However, the 200 members constitute 60% of Oregon National Guardsmen

“who are trained to quickly respond to emergencies, including national disasters.” Declaration of

Brigadier General Alan R. Gronewold, ECF 34 ¶ 3.

​

Defendants also argue that these harms from diversion are “so conclusory” as to render

them “utterly meaningless.” Resp., ECF at 37. But the increased need for state and local law

​

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enforcement reflects reality. On the night the September 28, 2025, National Guard federalization

order was announced, the size of the protests increased substantially, ballooning to around 200

people, with a second protest at a different location including “a few hundred.” Schoening Decl.,

Ex. B, ECF 12-1 at 1. Moreover, this Court notes that in Los Angeles, the National Guard

mobilizations inflamed protests, spawned unrest at new locations, and required additional

resources from the California Highway Patrol. Brief for the State of California and Governor

Newsom as Amici Curiae, ECF 41-1 at 11. Likewise, the deployment of federal law enforcement

officers to Portland in 2020 “reignited” protests and riots that had “largely self-extinguished.”

Declaration of Caroline Turco, ECF 13 ¶ 3.

​

C. Balancing the Equities and Public Interest

Lastly, the balance of the equities and the public interest, see E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant,

993 F.3d at 668, also weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ TRO. The public has a profound

interest in “prevent[ing] irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a

meaningful decision on the merits.” Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th

Cir. 2008)). Put simply, the issues at stake in this case are important, and the consequences of

this Court’s decision are far-reaching. As soon as the federalized National Guard deploys to

Portland, the state of Oregon will suffer an injury to its sovereignty. Conversely, if the TRO

issues, federal law enforcement may continue “to protect federal personnel, functions, and

property in Oregon.” ECF 1-1 at 2. In addition, both state and federal law enforcement officers

may continue to arrest protestors who violate the law. The impact on Defendants, if any, is

therefore de minimis.4

​

4 Defendants claim that they have a “significant” and “uncontested interest in the

protection of federal agents and property and the faithful execution of the law.” Newsom II, 141

​

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Furthermore, this country has a longstanding and foundational tradition of resistance to

government overreach, especially in the form of military intrusion into civil affairs. “That

tradition has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example, in . . . the

constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15

(1972); see also James Madison, Address to the Constitutional Convention (1787), reprinted in 1

Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 465 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“A standing

military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The

means of defence [against] foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at

home.”). This historical tradition boils down to a simple proposition: this is a nation of

Constitutional law, not martial law. Defendants have made a range of arguments that, if

accepted, risk blurring the line between civil and military federal power—to the detriment of this

nation.

​

F.4th at 1054–55. But the record demonstrates that the threats to that interest in Portland do not

warrant the extraordinary measure of bringing in the military. Rather, based on the current

record, it is clear that any threats to federal agents and property are readily remedied—as they

have been—by federal civilian law enforcement, with the support of State and local law

enforcement. Therefore, this interest cannot overcome the countervailing balance of equities and

public interest that weigh in favor of Plaintiffs.

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Case 3:25-cv-01756-IM Document 56 Filed 10/04/25 Page 30 of 31

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PAGE 31 – OPINION AND ORDER

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CONCLUSION

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For the above reasons, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order, ECF 6, and temporarily enjoins Defendants’ September 28, 2025, Memorandum ordering

the federalization and deployment of Oregon National Guard service members to Portland. The

TRO expires in fourteen days on October 18, 2025, and the parties are ORDERED to comply

with the attached TRO. The Defendants’ request to stay or administratively stay the Temporary

Restraining Order, see Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order, ECF 35 at 41, is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED

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DATED this 4th day of October, 2025 at 3:40 p.m. pacific daylight time.

/s/ Karin J. Immergut

Karin J. Immergut

United States District Judge

Case 3:25-cv-01756-IM Document 56 Filed 10/04/25 Page 31 of 31